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Cognitive science is a multidisciplinary approach to the study of mind and intelligence. Its main goals are to draw
the architecture of cognition and to understand how cognition enables an organism to interact with and to produce
adaptive behaviour within its environment.  Cognitive science has also been defined as the study of the different
forms of intelligence that characterize the domains of humans, animals and machines (Von Eckardt 2001). Because
of the complexities intrinsic to the study of the mind and of the different levels and perspectives from which it may
be studied, some theorists prefer to speak of ‘cognitive sciences’ in the plural (Miller 2003).
Some characteristics that were defining of cognitive science in the 1960s are now considered of doubtful utility,
while others that were initially marginal occupy a central role in current theorizing. A consequence of the dynamic
and multidisciplinary nature of cognitive science is that it is often unclear whether it should be defined based on its
object of study (the mind) or on a particular epistemological and methodological approach to it (the simulative or
computational one). The only way to avoid this question is to conflate ontology and methodology, an option that
presents  problems  of  its  own.  For  these  reasons,  the  nature  of  cognitive  science  is  better  understood  from a
historical perspective. The proximal intellectual roots of cognitive science may be situated around the middle of the
20th century with the rise of cybernetics (Wiener 1948). This new science claimed that complex machines have to
have control systems (that is, subcomponents of their architecture in charge of governing their inner functioning and
their interactions with the external world), and that all such systems are to be considered instances of the same
natural  kind.  Control  systems  began to be  considered as  machines  in their turn and, because  Turing machines
(Turing 1936), of which digital computers practically are physical incarnations, were provably able to simulate the
functioning of any other finite machine, digital computers  began to be used to understand and duplicate control
systems. The next step on this path was to view the mind as a control system in its turn (Miller et al. 1960) and to
therefore claim that it is a machine (Chomsky 1957) and can be simulated by a digital computer. The final pillar of
the burgeoning discipline was the reification of the analogy, that is, the claim that human minds – all minds, actually
– are digital computers (Newell and Simon 1976).
These final steps took place in the mid-1950s when some disciplines began to view computer simulation as the
unifying methodology for the study of the human mind and its cognitive processes (Bara 1995). A specific event,
which is often taken to be the birth date of the new science, is a symposium on information science that was held at
the  Massachusetts  Institute  for  Technology  in  Boston on the  11th  of  September  1956  (Gardner  1985).  The
converging disciplines  were  philosophy, psychology, computer science  (later to become artificial  intelligence),
neuroscience, linguistics and anthropology (Keysers et al. 1978). The formalization of the enterprise as a properly
recognized scientific discipline took place in 1977 when the journal Cognitive Science commenced publication, and
was completed with the first conference of the Cognitive Science Society in 1979 at the University of California at
San Diego.
The subcommunities within psychology that underwent the ‘cognitive revolution’ (Miller 2003) were thus able to
abandon behaviourism, which had considered that mind and cognition were unamenable to scientific inquiry. The
simulative methodology was based on the functionalistic assumption that the physical structure on which cognitive
processes are built in the human body is  substantially irrelevant.  If, given an input, a computational model can
reproduce the same output of a mental process, it may be claimed that such a model reproduces that process, and
this is claimed to be all that needs to be understood about it (Turing 1950; Pylyshyn 1984).
This  close relationship between artificial intelligence and psychology thus lies  at the very heart of cognitive
science.  Human  beings  are  conceived  of  as  information  processors  with  limited  capacities  and  top-down
architecture, capable of coding, elaborating, storing and retrieving symbolic structures that represent the objective
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external world (Neisser 1967; Lindsay and Norman 1977). Knowledge representation and organization (Collins and
Quillian 1969; Pylyshyn 1973; Minsky 1974; Bobrow and Collins 1975; Schank and Abelson 1977; Kosslyn 1980)
rapidly began to be viewed as the kernel of cognition and accordingly became the central topic of cognitive science.
This  was followed by reasoning  and thought (Johnson-Laird 1983; Newell and Simon 1972; Wason and Evans
1975).  Great attention was also devoted to the study of perception (Winston 1975; Marr 1982; Ellis and Young
1988), attention (Broadbent 1958; Deutsch and Deutsch 1963; Norman and Shallice 1980), memory (Atkinson and
Shiffrin 1968; Shallice and Warrington 1970; Craik and Lockhart 1972; Schank 1980; Baddeley 1986), and language
(Chomsky, 1957, 1965, 1980; Winograd 1972; Grosz et al. 1986; Ellis and Young 1988). In the 1980s, substantially
the same cognitive functions also began to be studied through connectionist models, which rejected the top-down
architecture  of  cognitive  functions  and  used  distributed  models  of  cognition,  with  an  emphasis  on  learning
(McClelland et al. 1986; Rumelhart et al. 1986; Elman et al. 1996; but see Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988).
Beginning in the 1980s, both the simulative methodology and the identification of mind and computation began to
be questioned (Searle 1980). A diversity of criticisms has since led to a matching variety of reactions and further
developments.  In terms  of  community  size,  the  most  successful  of  these  criticism/development  blocks  is  the
substitution of the brain for the digital computer. Claims about the importance and the specificity of the neurological
substrate  on which cognitive  processes  rely,  as  well  as  the  fast  technological  advancements  in neuroimaging
techniques,  has  led  cognitive  neuroscience  with its  methodology  to  be  elected  as  the  new core  discipline  of
cognitive science (Gazzaniga 1999). Here, cognitive processes are claimed to be better (or only) understood if they
are  linked to  the  activity  of specific  brain regions  or neural  networks.  The  functionalistic  assumption and the
‘arrows-and-boxes’  approach of  classical  cognitive  science  are  recast  in terms  of  the  isomorphism principle
(Eysenck and Keane 1990), which assumes that a correspondence exists between the cognitive architecture of the
mind and the physical structure of the brain. This principle is commonly understood as the notion that cognitive
processes are segregated in dedicated submachines called modules.
Assumptions about the modularity of the mind here tend to be cast in so-called ‘Darwinian’ rather than in
strictly Fodorian terms. The main difference is that Fodor’s (1975, 1983) modules are supposed to be unintelligent,
non-inferential submechanisms that are in charge of feeding the central processes with the raw materials  starting
from which they begin actual computations.  However, Darwinian modules  are  supposed to be  simple, domain-
specific, locally intelligent mechanisms that operate within a completely distributed model of cognition (Minsky
1986),  where  the  very  existence  of  general-purpose  central  processes  is  claimed  to  be  impossible  from an
evolutionary viewpoint (Barkow et al. 1992; Cosmides and Tooby 1994a, 1994b; Pinker 1997). Accordingly, the
cognitive processes investigated and their modular physical counterparts  are defined as types of organism/world
interactions  like  social  cognition,  parenting and  foraging rather  than more  abstract  functions  like  memory  or
attention.  The  study of cognitive  impairments  and of their double  dissociations  in patients  with specific  brain
damages, and the use of neuroimaging techniques to understand which brain regions  are more active during the
execution of specific cognitive tasks have thus become crucial steps in the construction and the falsification of
hypotheses about the architecture of human mind (McCarthy and Warrington 1990).
A second criticism/development block has  been concerned with the  allegedly too abstract and disembodied
description of cognition given by classical cognitive science, and has worked from the assumption that only the
empirical study of real organism/world interactions may yield a real understanding of cognition (Agre 1995). This
claim has  often been associated with the  rejection of the  notion that  representation  is  the  central  property of
cognition (Brooks 1991a, 1991b). Taken together, these claims have led to the development of autonomous robotics
(Maes 1991), which is  the material engineering of simple artificial agents  that are able to move and to perform
simple tasks in the real world. Robotics has thus become able to trade concepts and metaphors with biology and its
subdisciplines..
A third criticism of classical cognitive science has been its alleged incapability of (or lack of interest in) dealing
with topics such as context and culture, and with the social and ontogenic features of the mind in general. Classical
cognitive science is taken to have preferred a supposedly universal, rational and rigidly innate idea of the mind.
Here, scientific focus has been shifting from the mind and brain to the whole organism that is formed by a biological
body with a biological mind, placed into an environment that includes language, culture, values, and the individual’s
personal history. The physical, interpersonal and sociocultural context in which cognition takes place, which was
treated by early cognitive scientists as noise, has thus gained increasing importance (Westbury and Wilensky 1998;
Bruner 1990), and studies of culture (Hutchins 1995; Cole 1996; Tomasello 1999), situated cognition and activity
(Agre 1997; Clancey 1997; Wenger 1999) and the bodily bases of cognition (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson
1987; Clark 1997) have begun to flourish.
The fourth and most radical departure from the classical perspective has been based on the re-evaluation of
consciousness  and subjectivity  as  the  main – or only –  feature  of cognition.  It  has  been argued that  classical
cognitive science’s adoption of the ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel 1986) is a fatal mistake and that no comprehension
of the mind is possible while its subjective nature is neglected. This has led subcommunities of researchers to delve
into studies of consciousness (Nagel 1974; Maturana and Varela 1980; Edelman 1992; Searle 1992; Chalmers 1996;
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Damasio 1999) and sometimes to even adopt views based on radical constructivism and phenomenology (Guidano
1987, 1991; Dreyfus 1990; Varela et al. 1991; Varela 1996). As discussed above, the extent to which works like
these still pertain to cognitive science – and probably, therefore, the very future of the discipline – depends on
whether the discipline itself is defined on ontological or methodological grounds.
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